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The effect of personality on reasoning
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The ability to reason depends on intelligence3, but preferences for different sorts of 
reasoning may depend on an individual’s personality. The possibility is unlikely if 
reasoning is akin to a formal proof in logic 4, 5.  But, such effects are predicted from 
the theory that reasoning is a semantic process of envisaging possibilities consistent 
with the meanings of premises and knowledge6. According to the standard ‘big 
five’ model of personality7, individuals differ in their openness to experience and in 
their conscientiousness.  Certain inferential problems are ambiguous, e.g., if a pilot 
falls from a plane without a parachute then the pilot dies; this pilot didn’t die; how 
come? A deductive response is: the pilot didn’t fall from a plane without a 
parachute; an inductive response is: the plane was on the ground. Highly 
conscientious individuals who are also less open to experience should focus on the 
possibilities consistent with the premises, and tend to make a deduction, whereas 
those who are open to experience and not very conscientious should go beyond 
these possibilities, and tend to make an induction.  Here we show that these biases 
occurred both for stable personality traits and for the same attitudes induced 
experimentally, either from false feedback about performance in a personality test 
or from participants’ recall of autobiographical episodes illustrating the required 
attitudes.  Researchers have often assumed that reasoning is a universal akin to the 
ability to use natural language4.   They have also assumed that personality traits 
are stable with constant effects on cognition and behaviour8,9. Our results imply 
that neither assumption is invariably correct.  They also corroborate the semantic 
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view of human reasoning, and may lead to the discovery of other effects of 
personality traits, such as extraversion and neuroticism, on reasoning.
Not everyone thinks in the same way, and personality may influence the way people 
reason. According to the standard model of personality all individuals can be located in 
a five-dimensional space depending on the degree to which they have each of five major 
traits: openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and 
neuroticism.  If reasoning is a formal process akin to formulating a proof in logic then, 
as theorists propose, a single deterministic theory should apply to everyone5. But, if 
reasoning depends instead on a semantic process in which individuals envisage 
possibilities consistent with the meanings of premises and their knowledge6, then 
personality should yield a preference between the two major sorts of reasoning: 
deduction vs. induction.   In a valid deduction, the conclusion must hold in all the 
possibilities consistent with the premises, whereas in an induction, the conclusion goes 
beyond these possibilities to yield a plausible hypothesis or explanation.  It follows that 
those who are not open to experience but highly conscientious should focus on the 
possibilities consistent with the premises, and therefore tend to make deductions, 
whereas those who are open to experience and not highly conscientious should go 
beyond the possibilities, and therefore tend to make inductions.   Our research has 
corroborated this prediction.
Our experiments used problems that could be solved by either a deduction or an 
induction, e.g.: ‘If you follow this diet then you lose weight. Ann did not lose weight. 
Why not?’ A valid deduction underlies the answer: ‘Ann didn’t follow this diet,’ but an 
induction underlies the answer: ‘Ann had a metabolic problem’. Our first experiment 
tested 104 students from the University of La Laguna who completed the NEO-PI-R 
personality test on line. Two weeks later, they carried out ten reasoning problems, 
which each had the same form as the previous example but different contents. No 
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relation between the two parts of the experiment was explicit to them, and two different 
experimenters recruited them.  We confirmed a significant bimodal distribution (n= 
104, Chi-square= 23.981; df.=10; p<0.008; two-tailed) in the numbers of spontaneous 
inductions that participants tended to make given ten such problems (Fig. 1): those who 
were higher in conscientiousness than openness tended to make deductions (only 19% 
inductions, see left-side of Fig.), whereas those who were higher in openness than 
conscientiousness tended to make inductions (81%, see right-side of Fig; Mann-
Whitney U=56.5; z=2.16; p<0.02; one-tailed). Previous research on personality and 
intelligence has shown that open individuals tend to be more intelligent than average10, 
but we found no reliable relation between our participants’ intelligence or academic 
achievement and their personality traits or tendency to make inductions. PAU scores 
(university admission marks based on school grades and an examination) for 43 
participants correlated with the proportion of inductions with r= -0.264. PAU scores 
correlated with the five traits as follows: Neuroticism, r= 0.104, Extraversion r= -0.178, 
Openness r= 0.108, Agreeableness r= -0.079, Conscientiousness r= 0.026. Similarly, the 
correlations between Thurstone's Primary Mental Abilities (PMA) reasoning subscale11 
for 24 participants and number of inductions was r= -0.007. It correlated with the traits 
as follows: Neuroticism, r=0.287; Extraversion r= -0.131; Openness r=0.030; 
Agreeableness r= -0.116; Conscientiousness r= -0.225. Hence, neither academic ability 
nor intelligence correlated reliably with the number of inductions or the personality 
traits.
Personality traits are not so stable across all situations12. Hence, it should be possible to 
elicit a temporary trait-like attitude. In a second experiment we took advantage of this 
possibility to manipulate the participants’ attitudes and to test the effects of this 
manipulation on their predilection for a certain sort of reasoning. This experiment 
replicated the results of the first experiment after the participants had been given a fake 
but convincing report about their personalities. A new sample of 99 undergraduate 
students from Universidad de La Laguna were paid 10 euros ($13) to participate. First, 
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they completed the NEO-PI-R. One year later, they carried out the experiment. They 
were assigned at random to one of three groups receiving fake feedback about their 
personalities signed by the professor on their personality course: the open group (high 
in openness and low in conscientiousness), the conscientious group (low in openness 
and high in conscientiousness), and the control group (high in agreeableness and low in 
extraversion). The descriptions of the profiles were based on terms selected from the list 
of familiar personality adjectives on the five factors13. The experimenter who gave them 
their profiles did not know that these profiles had been assigned at random. Results 
confirmed that those who had learned that they were open to experience and low in 
conscientiousness made reliably more inductions than control participants, who had 
received a fake report about their extraversion and agreeableness. In contrast, those who 
had learned that were low in openness to experience but high in conscientiousness made 
reliably less inductions than the control participants (3.8 for the open group, 2.7 for the 
control group, and 1.9 for the conscientiousness group (Jonckheere-Terpstra trend test, 
z=2.069, p<0.02).
A final experiment replicated the effect when the participants were asked to remember 
episodes in their lives relevant to the traits of openness and conscientiousness. A sample 
of 147 students from the University of Malaga was randomly assigned to three groups: 
open, control, and conscientious. Each group carried out a recall task, then the 
ambiguous reasoning task, and finally a short version of the NEO-PI-R. In the recall 
task, they had to recall ten episodes in their lives in which they had behaved in a given 
way based on phrases describing the episodes adapted from Goldberg’s (1999) 
International Personality Item Pool representation of the NEO-PI-R.   To ensure that 
they envisaged episodes, they had to write a sentence describing each episode that they 
recalled, and to rate on five-point scales how difficult it was to recall the episode and 
how pleasant it had been. The results showed that those who were told to remember 
episodes in which they were open and not so conscientious made more inductions than 
control participants, who were told to remember episodes in which they were 
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extraverted and agreeable. In contrast, those who were told to remember episodes in 
which they were not open to experience but high in conscientiousness made reliably 
less inductions than the control participants (5.9 for the open group, 5.2 for the control 
group, and 4.6 for the conscientious group; Jonckheere-Terpstra non-parametric trend 
test, z=1.964; p<0.025). The mean PAU scores for 59 participants were:  6.86 for the 
open group, 6.77 for the conscientious group, and 7.14 for the control group (Kruskal-
Wallis, z=0.754, p>0.68). However, Spearman’s rank correlation revealed a marginal 
tendency for those scoring higher on PAU to make more deductions (tau = -0.22; 
p=0.094; two-tailed), a result consistent with previous findings.
We conclude that differences in personality, and in particular those concerning the traits 
of openness and conscientiousness, do affect the characteristic ways in which 
individuals tend to reason.  Openness and a lack of conscientiousness, whether they are 
stable traits or experimentally induced attitudes, lead individuals to think about 
possibilities outside those that the premises elicit.  They are more likely to think 
‘outside the box’. As a result, their response to an ambiguous problem is to make 
inductions that explain phenomena.  But, their polar opposites in personality do not go 
beyond the possibilities for the premises, and accordingly tend to make deductions.
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Figure caption:
Figure 1.
 The numbers of participants in Experiment 1 who made 0-2 inductions (i.e., 8-
10 deductions), 3-4 inductions, and so on, up to 9-10 inductions, for all the 
problems. Superimposed, the means in Openness (red) and Conscientiousness 
(blue) with standard error. 
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